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1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case No. 12-11560-alg
4	x
5	In the Matter of:
6	B&M LINEN CORP.,
7	Debtors.
8	x
9	ADV. PROC. NO.: 12-0185-alg
10	B&M LINEN CORP., ET AL.,
11	Plaintiffs,
12	v
13	220 LAUNDRY, LLC, ET AL.,
14	Defendants.
15	x
16	United States Bankruptcy Court
17	One Bowling Green
18	New York, New York
19	
20	January 9, 2013
21	11:03 a.m.
22	
23	BEFORE:
24	HON ALLAN L. GROPPER
25	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Page 2 1 Hearing re: Motion by laundry, dry cleaning workers and Allied Industries Benefit Funds to convert the debtor's case to Chapter 7 or, alternatively, for appointment of a Chapter 3 11 trustee 4 5 6 Case Conference 7 8 Motion by the UST to convert Chapter 11 case or in the 9 alternative to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee 10 11 Debtor's objection to proof of claim no. 14 filed by 220 12 Laundry, LLC 13 Adversary proceeding: 12-01885-alg B&M Linen Corp., et al. v 14 15 220 Laundry, LLC, et al.: Pretrial conference 16 17 Adversary proceeding: 12-01885-alg B&M Linen Corp., et al. v 220 Laundry, LLC, et al.: Motion by Defendants for partial 18 19 summary judgment 20 21 22 23 24 25 Transcribed by: Sherri L. Breach, CERT\*D-397

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Page 5 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE Attorneys for U.S. Trustee 33 Whitehall Street 21st Floor New York, New York 10004 BY: MICHAEL DRISCOLL, ESQ. 

Page 6 PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: B&M Linen Corp. 3 MR. DRISCOLL: Good morning, Your Honor. Michael Driscoll for the U.S. Trustee. 4 5 MR. SHAFFERMAN: Good morning. Joel Shafferman, 6 Shafferman & Feldman for the debtor. 7 MS. HAZAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Nava Hazan, McDermott, Will & Emery on behalf of the Marcus's and 220 8 9 Coster, LLC. MR. SUGRUE: Stephen Sugrue for 220 Laundry, LLC, 10 a creditor in the lead case, and party to the adversary 11 12 proceeding. 13 MR. MENER: Appearing on behalf of the Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Leon Z. Mener. 14 15 MR. GELBER: Lawrence Gelber, Schulte, Roth & 16 Zabel, for the laundry, dry cleaning workers and Allied 17 Benefit Fund. MR. PREITE: Good morning, Your Honor. Ralph 18 Preite, Sichenzia, Ross, Friedman & Ference, for All Points 19 20 Capital Leasing Company. I apologize for my casual 21 appearance, Your Honor, but I consented --22 THE COURT: All right. 23 MR. PREITE: -- an adjournment last week and then 24 I found out this morning this matter hadn't been adjourned. 25 THE COURT: You're perfectly well-dressed.

Page 7 had people much more casual, and maybe it will introduce a good -- a feeling of good cheer into the room. But we'll see. Do you want to start, Mr. Shafferman? MR. SHAFFERMAN: If I may, Your Honor. THE COURT: We don't have anybody on the telephone on this matter, do we? I don't think so. MR. SHAFFERMAN: Well, in terms of a status, I can touch on a few -- a few points. I guess most positively and significantly on Monday of this week, Hanover Insurance, which is the insurer of both of the properties, informed us that an additional \$2 million of insurance proceeds under the commercial insurance policy will be remitted or paid by the end of this week. And they also talked about the timing of remaining payments under the insurance policies, also, on top of the additional two. And --THE COURT: So there is now 4 million of insurance total? MR. SHAFFERMAN: Yes. That's -- that's correct. And they've -- the conversations and their questions were directed towards counsel for Coster (ph) and the individuals. But that's, yeah, what we've been advised. To that end, last evening the debtor and the Marcus Coster group jointly filed or filed a joint motion

seeking an order directing that all insurance proceeds be

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Page 8 deposited into CRIS, the Court Registry Investment System. 1 2 And --THE COURT: I -- I directed --3 4 MR. SHAFFERMAN: Yes. 5 THE COURT: -- at the last hearing that all 6 insurance proceeds be paid into the court. That hasn't been 7 done yet? 8 MR. SHAFFERMAN: No. We were trying to just deal 9 with the --THE COURT: I think that should be done today. 10 You have now a motion? 11 12 MR. SHAFFERMAN: We have a motion. 13 MS. HAZAN: Yes, we do. THE COURT: Well, I'm going to sign that today. 14 15 MR. SHAFFERMAN: Okay. 16 THE COURT: I don't think we need any notice to pay funds into the court. Where is -- is it -- is it on the 17 18 MR. SHAFFERMAN: Docket. 19 20 THE COURT: -- docket? I would --21 MR. SHAFFERMAN: It --22 MS. HAZAN: Yes. 23 THE COURT: If it went on the docket, it went on 24 the docket either late last night or --25 MS. HAZAN: That's correct, Your Honor. It was --

Page 9 THE COURT: -- early this morning. 1 2 MS. HAZAN: It was filed around 5 p.m. last night. 3 THE COURT: All right. MR. SHAFFERMAN: Okay. We'll -- so that --4 5 THE COURT: So there's 2 million in hand now; is 6 that correct? 7 MR. SHAFFERMAN: That's correct. THE COURT: And the other 2 million is coming in? 8 9 MS. HAZAN: I was -- I was told it would be -- it 10 would be coming in at -- by the end of this week on Friday. 11 THE COURT: That should be immediately paid into 12 court. 13 MS. HAZAN: Sure. MR. SHAFFERMAN: And mechanically the -- well, 14 15 we've been -- been interfacing with the clerk's office in 16 terms of paying it in, whether the payee is someone other 17 than the court -- the government or the court. That's, I 18 guess, the mechanical issue we were dealing with in terms of the order and -- and how that would all work. That was the 19 20 basis for the motion. 21 But there's -- you know, there's no question the 22 check is -- is there and --23 THE COURT: Well, the rights --24 MR. SHAFFERMAN: -- it's good for --25 THE COURT: -- of all parties to the actual funds

Page 10 1 are reserved. 2 MS. HAZAN: Yeah. That's --3 THE COURT: Whoever is entitled to them remain 4 entitled to them. It's only paid into the court for 5 safekeeping purposes. 6 MS. HAZAN: And that was reflected in the order, 7 Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. SHAFFERMAN: So on that note, we're -- the --10 and I've also been advised that the investigation by the 11 fire marshal should be completed this week. I know I said 12 that at the last hearing, but I guess with all the other 13 issues the insurance companies are dealing with in the holiday season, things got delayed. But that's what we've 14 15 been assured. And -- and without being too speculative, 16 it's -- it's just my -- my sense of logic is that given the 17 additional money that's coming, that probably boats well for 18 where the investigation is going to come out. So we feel cautiously optimistic about --19 20 THE COURT: How much more --21 MR. SHAFFERMAN: -- that whole thing? 22 THE COURT: -- insurance money is expected? 23 MS. HAZAN: Well, under both policies there is 24 approximately \$15 million, and now the fire adjuster for the -- for the debtor is now -- is meeting tomorrow with the 25

Page 11 fire adjuster for Hanover and they're going to discuss what amounts exactly are going to be paid. It's not going to be -- I mean, it is not going to be the total amount, but we're expecting -- we're expecting a significant amount. MR. SHAFFERMAN: So -- and, actually, in speaking with the clerk's office -- I will -- I will reach out to them again. The monies are deposited, I believe, up until 1:00 on Wednesday, you know, one time a week. So before we send a check down, should -- would -- I would call the gentleman from the clerk's office and see, do they hold the check if it's going to miss the 1:00 time or should we hold it and send it with the two checks or the additional check that we send -- we receive this week so that it's definitely, you know, set for the next window, which would be the 15th. That would be mechanically --THE COURT: Where -- where are the funds now? your firm, ma'am? MS. HAZAN: No, sir. MR. SHAFFERMAN: No. No. The issue was the checks --THE COURT: Where are the -- where -- oh, the check --MR. SHAFFERMAN: The check is --

MR. SHAFFERMAN: It's a physical check because it

THE COURT: -- hasn't been cashed?

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THE COURT: And where does that reside?

MR. SHAFFERMAN: It's in my office in the -- in -you know, in a safe place. And it -- the issue with negotiating it into a normal escrow or to the office was that it was payable to -- not only to the debtor and to the Marcus's and Coster, but also to the mortgagee on the building, and that was the difficulty or the mechanical issue in terms of negotiating the check.

I mean, the check is -- is good for six months. It's a check that was issued in November and there's no question with that. It's just a matter of mechanically, you know, dealing -- dealing with it. So that was, I think --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SHAFFERMAN: -- the purpose of the motion and the order so that there would be no mechanical issues.

THE COURT: Well, I would ask interested parties to look at the order on the docket immediately and -- but before the end of the day. Let the Court know if there's any question. We could have a telephone call if there's any question with regard to the form of the order.

MR. PREITE: If I may, Your Honor. If I recall correctly, a prior order had been entered in this case directing insurance proceeds to be deposited into debtor's counsel account. So if this new order that's being proposed

is entered, I think we'll have conflicting orders.

So for purposes of clarity, perhaps the new proposed order should reference the old order, void it, direct any funds that may have been deposited into debtor's counsel's account to be forwarded to the court account so it's consistent with any new order that might be submitted.

Was there a check deposited?

MR. SHAFFERMAN: The -- no. The only check that was received was a prepetition retainer which was all part of the retention application. But, no. But I -- we -- certainly the debtor has no objection to the order containing that language nor -- nor do I.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SHAFFERMAN: So in terms of the other issues in the case, Your Honor did enter the bar order. The bar date was the 27th of December. That has -- that has passed and we -- myself and the counsel for Marcus's intend to go through all the claims and ferret out any issues that we may have. Before making any objections we will reach out to the interested parties and try to keep any -- any of that stuff to a minimum. But there were really no major surprises that we didn't expect.

The proceed -- we believe that the high end of the claims would be roughly \$4 million, so it would be somewhere between 3 to \$4 million in terms of claims, with -- putting

aside -- which is -- makes the plan that we've proposed feasible and, frankly, we're -- we would -- we're -- we feel that we're ready to go for disclosure statement and confirmation. The only issue that, I guess, could be a bar to that or -- or that hurdle, if you will, is the issue of the litigation with 220 Laundry.

On December 17th, 220 Laundry filed its motion for summary judgment. We've been in discussions with Mr.

Sugrue, who is here today, on a discovery schedule and we're hopefully -- we'll get that concluded. And the debtor in 220 also intend to file our own motion for summary judgment to seek a declaration that 220 breached the modified APA and it's not entitled to any insurance proceeds.

However, you know, in thinking about it and the litigation in terms of the length and potential cost, we've -- we haven't raised this with 220 Laundry's counsel yet, but in discussions with the debtor and with the Marcus's, they would be amenable to trying to take a crack at submitting that dispute to the mediation panel with this court to hopefully, maybe shortcut all the litigation and have a settlement, which then would put us in a position to really confirm this plan on -- on the fast track.

THE COURT: What -- what discovery are you talking about?

MS. HAZAN: We were talking about the discovery

with respect to the proof of claim as well as the summary judgments.

THE COURT: Yes. No. I understand that. But what -- what is the nature of the discovery?

MS. HAZAN: Well, the discovery would be basically to -- to get -- I mean, we would need -- we would like to take the deposition of all the -- of all the defendants and we would like also to understand how the damages have been calculated. So we would -- we would request any documents explaining how the damages were calculated for each item in the proof of claim.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAFFERMAN: The other issue out -- we've discussed or was raised was we made a motion by notice of presentment to approve a stipulation with conedison which fixes their prepetition claim and requires the payment of their administrative claim in the amount of \$173,000 to be paid within 90 days or on the effective date of a plan, whichever comes sooner.

There was a limited objection filed, I think, two days ago by the funds, the labor -- the laundry funds.

We've discussed, prior to the court hearing this morning, that in view of the imminent arrival of the additional funds -- money funds to put in to escrow, they've both agreed to adjourn the matter until -- for a few days. We had noticed

the motion on the insurance proceeds being filed with the Court for the 23rd.

There is also a pending motion, which we hope to resolve, but by an administrative creditor with a \$30,000 claim for immediate payment. That's also scheduled for the 23rd. So our thought was to adjourn the submission of the presentment of that order to the 23rd and to see where we are in terms of the hopeful progress.

I'm not speaking for them, but I believe the conEdison counsel and the funds counsel, who are both here, would agree to that temporary resolution of that issue.

THE COURT: All right. But I -- I'm -- well, I'll hear from the parties. I'm not going to delay entry of the order --

MR. SHAFFERMAN: No.

THE COURT: -- requiring payment of the insurance proceeds into the court.

MR. SHAFFERMAN: No. No. That wasn't -- it's just that we had picked the -- that arbitrary date of the 23rd because the motion had been pending. But I certainly have no problem with the same date, you know.

THE COURT: All right. Does anyone want to be heard on the adjournment of the conEd stipulation?

All right. Yes, sir.

MR. MENER: We have no -- on behalf of conEdison,

- we have no objection to putting it off to January 23rd with
  the thought that the objection -- the limited objection to
  the payment of the administrative claim would be withdrawn
  by the moving -- the person that made the motion with
  respect to that because the additional funds have been paid.

  THE COURT: All right.

  MR. SHAFFERMAN: That's -- that's -- I'm sorry.

  MR. GELBER: Just to be clear, I -- we didn't say
  - MR. GELBER: Just to be clear, I -- we didn't say that we were definitely going to withdraw the objection. We said we would consider it. We would talk to our client about it.
- 12 THE COURT: All right.

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- MR. SHAFFERMAN: That -- that's what we have here

  in way of status. Unless Your Honor has additional --
- 15 THE COURT: All right.
- 16 MR. SHAFFERMAN: -- questions.
- THE COURT: Let me hear from any other party that wishes to be heard.
- MR. SUGRUE: Thank you, Your Honor. Steve Sugrue
  for 220 Laundry, LLC.
  - When we appeared on the 11th, I indicated we were imminently going to file a motion for partial summary judgment. I said we would do it by Monday, and we did. The subject of discovery did come up at the last appearance as did your -- Your Honor urging us to confer on a briefing

Page 18 1 schedule. 2 On January 2nd I spoke to Mr. Walsh. He had not yet read the motion for summary judgment. 3 THE COURT: Mr. Walsh? 4 5 MR. SUGRUE: Mr. Walsh, excuse me, of the 6 McDermott, Will, Emery --7 THE COURT: Oh, right... MR. SUGRUE: -- firm representing the Marcus's. I 8 9 beg your pardon, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. SUGRUE: As of January 2nd he hadn't read the 12 motion for summary judgment. He wanted to discuss 13 discovery. I said, well, who do you -- who do you want to 14 depose from our side. He said he didn't know yet. I told 15 him that once he read the motion I think he would agree with 16 me that there is no discovery necessary as respects the 17 limited issues raised by that partial summary judgment motion. 18 They are critical issues to the case, to the lead 19 20 case and to the adversary proceeding, but we didn't make the 21 motion for summary judgment believing there were triable 22 issues of fact requiring discovery. If we had believed that we wouldn't have made the motion. 23 24 We certainly discussed the need for some discovery 25 in the case. Our motion has nothing to do with any of the

numbers in the case. It has to do with a resolution of the competing claims of material breach of the purchase agreement, such that resolution of the limited motion will determine whether we own the business, which we've been talking about since April, or whether somebody else owns it, whether the debtor owns it.

I think I had a -- I believe we have agreement from a discussion in the hall before today's appearances that would -- what we would like to do is set a briefing schedule. At the same time, we do not mind proceeding with a discovery schedule. From our standpoint, we regard it as unrelated to the pending motion, but, obviously, if a deposition gets taken next week prior to their time to respond to the summary judgment motion, they can use whatever information they've gathered. We're not trying to segregate or limit the scope of any discovery that may be taken.

so I urged with counsel for the Marcus's that we agree to allow their response to our December 17th motion to be filed -- served and filed by the end of this month, and that would include any cross-motions as she did indicate that there would likely be such a cross-motion. We could -- we could respond to that in two weeks. So, to me, that is one set of deadlines that's agreeable to us. I think it's agreeable to counsel for the Marcus's.

Separate and apart, we've urged them if they want to proceed with discovery to commence it. On January 2nd I spoke to Mr. Walsh. He had sent me a letter previously with his first item of proposed schedule being on or before January 2nd we will serve deposition notices and document requests. When I spoke to him on that very date, I said, go ahead. Let's go. I said, if you serve a document request, you will be surprised by how few documents we have, principally because we were summarily evicted from the premises. We were not told to gather our possessions and leave. We were told to leave.

I said, so, if you serve me with that document request today, as you indicated in this letter you would do, I said, I bet you within 24 hours I can tell you when I'll respond to it and when I do, I bet you it will be something like two or three days. So I expected to have document production done already.

Well, it isn't. I would like to engage Ms. Hazan in further discussions regarding that discovery schedule, but I want to segregate that from any agreement we can come to regarding the briefing schedule in the case. I think that's what will cause discovery to happen is when they want to take a deposition, perhaps in preparation of their opposition to summary judgment.

That's the way the movant would like to proceed,

Page 21 1 Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: All right. 3 MR. SUGRUE: Thank you. MS. HAZAN: Your Honor, I think -- just -- just to 4 5 explain what has happened, there is -- obviously, there is 6 the adversary proceeding and then there is also the proof of 7 claim that was filed, and then we filed with the debtor an objection. And the reason why -- you know, we have proposed 8 a certain schedule, and then when we looked at the adversary 9 10 proceeding as well as the -- as well as the proof of claim, 11 we thought that it may be more efficient, basically, to 12 serve discovery with respect to everything. 13 And that is when, basically, we -- and that is -and I've tried to -- yesterday or the day before I've tried 14 15 to discuss this, and I think we can -- I think we can come 16 up with a schedule. But I think the most efficient way for 17 us to do this would be to, basically, prepare a schedule 18 that would -- that would include both the proof of claim as 19 well as the issues that were raised in the summary judgment. 20 The -- and, again, you know, when we looked at the 21 -- when we looked at the issue, we would also support the --

we would also support the idea that a mediation in this case may be something that we could agree to.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. HAZAN: And the reason for that is that --

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1 because -- because, you know -- because we would like the 2 plan to move forward and we would like some finality with respect to this claim. And so we think it's the best --3 it's -- I think it's the best way for all the parties just 4 5 to go to mediation, try to see if we can settle this matter. I mean, this is the only -- I mean, in my view this is the 7 only matter that is still outstanding in a way. And so we 8 would like -- we would like to try to get it resolved as soon as possible. We don't think that a -- that a lengthy litigation is going to help in this case. 11 MR. SUGRUE: Just very briefly, Your Honor. 12 did litigate for six months in state court before we were 13 stayed by this proceeding from --14 THE COURT: You probably --15 MR. SUGRUE: -- proceeding. THE COURT: -- didn't get very far. MR. SUGRUE: Well, we went through preliminary 18 injunction motions. But you're right. We didn't get six 19 months' worth of litigation. Your Honor's quite correct. My point is this. There is -- there are no dollar 21 and cents issues in that partial motion -- motion for 22 partial summary judgment. We steadfastly avoided that. 23 Certainly, discovery is necessary as to that. So I just 24 want to get that motion that we have filed on a briefing 25 schedule. I think there was agreement that a response by

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the end of this month, including any cross-motions they may wish, was acceptable. Whatever they want to raise during discovery, I put no limits on that except the obvious, you know, general limits on relevance, et cetera. No special limitations, et cetera.

As to mediation, I would prefer that they pick up the phone and call us rather than go through some process where we have to schedule other people's times, et cetera. But I'm not going to take a hard line position that I oppose mediation or anything like that. Anytime they want to discuss a resolution we'll be happy to do it.

THE COURT: All right.

Well, unlike -- unlike some of the other interested parties, I have read the memorandum in support of a motion for summary judgment and I haven't studied it. I certainly am in no position to make any comment on it. And I don't make any official or any comment on it that should effect anyone's decision in this matter.

However, I am confused and it has to do with the relief that the movant is seeking. It was my view of -- at least I have a vague recollection from having taken contracts 40 years ago -- I think everyone in this room has taken it more recently than I have. But I have a view that someone who claims that the contract has been breached can either claim a breach and sue for damages and -- or affirm

the contract, and I don't know if you waive the breach, but you say, I want to go forward with the contract. Maybe I'm released from parts of it or from some obligations under the contract.

You speak, Mr. Sugrue, vaguely of, we own the business. There is no business. It's gone. I don't know what it is that your client would want to own, but the fire apparently has at least resolved that issue. There is no business to own. I may be wrong. I haven't been there. I don't know what the situation is. Maybe there can be rebuilding in this part of the Bronx. But I don't know that there's anything to own immediately, and I'm dealing only with what's before us today.

So it seems to me that what you're doing is claiming a breach and suing for damages. Now you can perhaps make an argument in connection with any plan in this case that somehow you're the debtor and any residual funds from insurance, after everyone is satisfied, comes to you rather than to the debtor or the punitive owners, the Marcus's.

But isn't that a function of damages; that you're

-- the contract is breached, you say by them, a material

breach that entitled you to terminate the contract. You

left. You say they evicted you, but you left from what I

see in your own papers, and you have a claim for damages.

Now it may be a huge claim as you assert in your proof of claim, but isn't that really what we're talking about?

That's my question because when you say, we own the business and you -- if you -- if you waive the breach and assume the contract, you're talking about paying another how many million, another 20 million, another 10 million over the next ten years. You don't want to do that, I don't think. That's not what your client has in mind.

MR. SUGRUE: Your Honor used the word "confusion," and I think one of the problems is that when we filed the complaint in the state court action there was an active, ongoing business and that complaint was not amended.

In our motion we effectively update, if you will, the complaint and address what we consider appropriate relief given the known circumstances: The filing of the bankruptcy and the fire.

To --

THE COURT: And -- and so what exactly what relief are you seeking?

MR. SUGRUE: The relief we're seeking would be attendant to the finding that there was a full transfer of the laundry business known as Myron & Sons Laundry by the entity which is the debtor to us. We did not acquire the stock of the debtor. It's not as though we are stepping in that debtor's shoes.

1 THE COURT: No. I understand that.

MR. SUGRUE: So there was, as far as we're concerned, an absolute, complete transfer of assets -- of certain asset -- defined assets to us in that assets purchase agreement. We owned, for example, the equipment which was damaged in the fire. It may be subject to other claims for security interests, but we owned it. We did not, by the way, own the real property.

If we were wrongfully evicted, however, we have a claim against the landlord for the wrongful eviction. We also claim an entitlement, for example, to business interruption insurance. It was our business that was interrupted, and these policies do identify us as an additional named insured.

On the subject of vacating the premises, we did so under protest, immediately put in a written notice saying that we reserve all of our rights. In effect, this is our business that you're taking from us. And if you want to go ahead and earn money running our business, you'll -- we make a claim to the profits of the business that should have been our profits as distinct from yours.

Another example is when we were thrown -
THE COURT: That's -- that is another word for

damages --

MR. SUGRUE: I --

THE COURT: -- for their --

MR. SUGRUE: Yes.

THE COURT: -- material breach.

MR. SUGRUE: Right.

THE COURT: But in terms of owning the business, are you going to pay into the debtor the \$10 million that was unpaid under the contract? Do you have that intent?

MR. SUGRUE: No, and the reason is this: There was a material misrepresentation as to the cost of doing business. What really took place in state court and the focus of that was to seek a declaration that we were the owner and then reform our purchase obligations consistent with the actual cost of doing business as distinct from the represented costs of doing business. And the difference is approximately \$600,000 a year, I would say at a minimum.

In other words, if we had been informed honestly of the cost of natural gas service to the facility in negotiating this deal, the purchase price wouldn't have been \$10.6 million. It would have been very substantially less than that. But any component of our damage claim -- and I'm not resisting the word "damage." I think you're correct in saying that's what we're after. Any component of -- any calculation of our damages would entail some component of our purchase price obligations going forward, but as adjusted to reflect the discovered fraud.

THE COURT: Well, it sounds to me like damages.

MR. SUGRUE: Yes. I agree. And in our proof of claim, by the way, notwithstanding an objection which says we never address our purchase obligations, we specifically address it and provide calculations at the end and throughout as to -- as to an appropriate, if you will, credit to the seller for our purchase obligation.

So we are not looking for a windfall here. We're looking for what would have been ours, taking into consideration all facts, including the fact that we would have had to pay something going forward on a promissory note.

Now if the adjustment to be made to the purchase price is overwhelmed by -- you know, the magnitude of the theft of utility services, I guess we would have an odd situation where the credit would be a negative number. I don't think that's the case, but it is a very, very significant adjustment. We're basically talking about them having paid -- or represented what was three days of utility service a month as distinct from 30 days. So it's a tenfold discrepancy.

And as we point out in the pending motion, that doesn't include what we call the escrow portion of the utility bills. We point out in our papers -- and this is why we do need some discovery. This motion steadfastly

avoids any issues of calculation. It is to get a basic determination as to whether our claim of material breach is valid versus their claim. But, eventually, it will --

THE COURT: I -- I still remain confused as to why that, at this point, is relevant.

MR. SUGRUE: Because --

THE COURT: The -- there is no question -- there is a -- you raise a question as to the materiality of your alleged breach and you raise a question that I don't know can be decided on the papers as to whether there was any breach at all: Was there an unsigned check; was the check due on Sunday; was it due on Friday. As I read the contract, there was a grace period. I don't -- it's not discussed very much, but there's a grace period and there's requirement of notice before a breach is called and I don't see that.

But assuming that your breach did not exist, on the record before me it would appear -- and I stress it would appear because I haven't heard from the debtor on this point -- but it would appear that there was a material breach of the debtor's relationship with conedison. There appears to be no dispute about that. And it's embodied in a stipulation that's coming before me the second time, and this is a different stipulation, but the matter came before me once before, as I'm sure coned will recall.

So I don't know that there's any dispute. Now maybe there's a dispute as to whether or not the conEd situation was a material breach of a contract; whether there was any representation that picked that up. That I can see being a matter of dispute.

But it seems to me that we're still talking about a contract that has been terminated. You haven't asked for reformation, and we're talking about what your damage claim is and whether your damage claim includes all future profits of the business, perhaps subject to whatever future payments you were required to make under the contract, and the like. We should take into account that there is no business. It may be restored to at the moment, and perhaps permanently.

And let me only say that -- I'm going to set a briefing schedule today. I believe that at the end of the day damages may be more important than any of this, so I think the parties really should get on with the question of damages because that's really what we're talking about, I think. And that isn't dealt with in your motion at all.

And I endorse wholeheartedly, as I think the most recent colloquy indicates, mediation because I think that it would help both parties focus on the issues and it might help. There's a lot of ill will between the parties for obvious reasons, and perhaps a mediator would help. I certainly endorse the concept that you talk among

Page 31 1 yourselves. Mediation is not free, but a mediator might --2 might help. 3 MR. SUGRUE: We're absolutely open to that, Your 4 Honor. 5 THE COURT: So now on the question of responsive 6 pleading, January 31st for your response and cross-motion? 7 MS. HAZAN: Well, I think, Your Honor -- I mean, 8 we're prepared to -- to enter into a -- we're prepared to 9 agree to a schedule. But my point is that just exactly as 10 you described. There are just too many facts in dispute and 11 I don't think that a summary judgment is --12 THE COURT: Well, that's --13 MS. HAZAN: -- is going to be --14 THE COURT: -- that's a --15 MS. HAZAN: -- helpful. 16 THE COURT: That's a time-honored response to a 17 motion for summary judgment. 18 MS. HAZAN: But --THE COURT: Too many facts in dispute. It may 19 20 make it difficult for you to make your cross-motion for 21 summary judgment, but I don't know that that isn't, in this 22 case as in many cases, a waste of time. 23 MS. HAZAN: You mean the summary judgment is --24 you mean that the -- I mean, my view is that going to the 25 route of the summary judgment is a waste of time because

Page 32 1 there are just too many facts in dispute. And so we're 2 going to find ourselves two months from now having -- having to deal with this same issue. Exactly as you said, this is 3 a question of damages. This is a question of whether there 4 5 was a breach and there -- this is a question of whether, you 6 know, the defendant breached --7 THE COURT: There was --MS. HAZAN: -- or the plaintiff breached. 8 9 THE COURT: -- a breach. Let us be clear on that. 10 The conEd theft, if I can use that word, was a breach. 11 may not have been a material breach. It may not have been a 12 specific representation in the contract, but --13 MS. HAZAN: Right. And so --THE COURT: -- there was something going on here 14 15 16 MS. HAZAN: Right. And so --17 THE COURT: -- and whether it affected the contract or not is another issue. 18 19 MS. HAZAN: And so the relief for a breach of 20 representation is in the form of damages. 21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 MS. HAZAN: And so this is what -- this is what we 23 have to talk about because, you know --24 THE COURT: But the damages can include every 25 penny that would have come to this debtor over the next --

permanently less the remainder of the purchase price or whatever the purchase price should have been. And I'm not sure that, in lieu of the -- in consequence of the fire I'm not sure that many of these calculations are necessary.

MS. HAZAN: Well, you see, Your Honor, the issue with respect to the breach of representation is that in the proof of claim that they filed, they claim approximately -- that the breach of representation would -- would entitle them to a claim for damages in the amount of 12 million.

And the way they calculate --

THE COURT: So their proof of claim is higher than that, isn't it 30 --

MS. HAZAN: \$32 million, but only --

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. HAZAN: -- with respect to the breach of representation with respect to the utility costs, 12 million. And the way this is calculated, as far as I understand it, is that they've calculated the costs for the next 30 years, what -- what the business would have to pay in terms of costs. And I'm just -- I'm just -- this is not the way damages have to be calculated and this is why I'm -- and this -- and I think there is enough issue of facts that the parties should just go to mediation and not -- and not lose more time and more money. This has to be resolved.

There's a number that has to come out of this -- out of this

Page 34 1 litigation. 2 THE COURT: I agree that mediation should start 3 immediately. 4 MS. HAZAN: Okay. 5 THE COURT: We have a panel of mediators, as you 6 may know. Some are more expensive than others. I think you 7 should find a mediator who has time --8 MS. HAZAN: Sure. 9 THE COURT: -- and has enough stature that he or 10 she would be someone your respective clients would at least 11 listen to. 12 MS. HAZAN: Sure. 13 THE COURT: And I endorse that wholeheartedly. But I think we need a deadline. If mediation is proceeding 14 15 and making progress, certainly that deadline can be 16 extended, but we need a deadline for your response to their 17 motion for summary judgment or we'll be playing around with 18 this for a long time. MS. HAZAN: Sure. So may I request that the 19 20 deadline be February 15th so that we have the time to gear 21 up the mediation and try to make some progress? 22 MR. SUGRUE: The end of this month will have given 23 them a month and a half from the filing of the motion. I'm 24 not going to split hairs here, but I think that's probably 25 enough. If you want to divide the difference and give them

Page 35 February 7th or something, that's fine. 1 2 MS. HAZAN: I mean, respectfully, you know, we're 3 just trying to move things forward and I don't think --4 MR. SUGRUE: Yeah, but you're not. 5 MS. HAZAN: -- a summary judgment motion is going to move things forward. 6 7 THE COURT: I do think -- I do think that -- I should say that I think this is without prejudice to the 8 9 debtor's right to have discovery on the question of damages 10 11 MR. SUGRUE: Absolutely. And --12 THE COURT: -- and the question of --13 MR. SUGRUE: And that can begin right away as far as we're concerned. 14 15 THE COURT: And that can also --16 MS. HAZAN: Yeah. 17 THE COURT: -- begin. But I haven't seen any --18 MS. HAZAN: I've urged it. I've urged it. THE COURT: -- movant on the debtor's part with 19 20 regard to this motion. I'll -- in order to give the 21 mediation a chance to succeed, I'll say February 15th. 22 MS. HAZAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: But I do think that you should consider that a firm date. 24 25 MS. HAZAN: Sure.

Page 36 1 MR. SUGRUE: Excellent. Thank you. THE COURT: And then give the debtor -- pardon me 2 3 -- give Mr. Sugrue two weeks --4 MR. SUGRUE: That would be fine, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: -- to reply. February 15th is a 6 Friday. Two weeks takes us to March 1st, and we should --7 can have a hearing on the motion for -- should we say March 8 5th? 9 MR. SUGRUE: That's fine with us, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: March 5th at 11:00. 11 In the meantime, you would like a hearing on 12 January the 23rd on the motion -- on the conEd motion and on 13 a report on where we stand --MR. SUGRUE: That's fine. 14 15 THE COURT: -- generally. 16 MR. GELBER: Just to complete the record, also, 17 the funds do still have a pending motion for conversion or 18 the appointment of a trustee, and we would agree to adjourn that motion to January 23rd also. 19 20 THE COURT: I think the U.S. Trustee does --21 MR. DRISCOL: That's correct, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: -- and we'll use that date for the initial case conference. 23 24 MR. DRISCOL: Thank you, Your Honor. 25 MR. MENER: At what time --

Page 37 1 MR. PREITE: Your Honor, Ralph Preite. I'm sorry, 2 Mr. Mener. Would you like to --3 MR. MENER: I just wanted to determine the time on 4 January 23rd. 5 THE COURT: Ten o'clock. 6 MR. PREITE: If I may, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Yes. MR. PREITE: Each time I've heard Mr. Sugrue 8 explain what his clients interest is, which is, if I 9 understand correctly, it closed on the acquisition of the 10 11 business. It operated the business, and then it claims it 12 was wrongfully evicted from the business premises, I can't 13 help but think -- and I believe I mentioned this last time 14 -- that perhaps the wrong debtor is here in possession, and 15 the wrong entity is administering the insurance proceeds, 16 and the wrong entity is in Chapter 11. 17 However, if I understood Mr. Sugrue today, perhaps that issue is resolved if, indeed, his client has shifted 18 away from seeking ownership of the debtor's business and is 19 20 now seeking damages. And I'm not trying to say you have 21 agreed to that, Mr. Sugrue. But if that is the case, then 22 maybe the issue of who owns the business is resolved. 23 But that brings me to a more important issue. I've -- and that issue is who has an interest or which 24 25 entities have interests in the insurance proceeds.

understand Mr. Sugrue's client is named as an additional insured. I don't know if that was on the building policy or the commercial policy. I know that my client, All Points Capital Corp. is named as an additional insured under, I believe, the commercial policy which debtor's counsel was kind enough to share. I think it was posted on -- on Pacer as well. And, of course, we filed a claim or we put the insurance company on notice of our claim or potential claim against the insurance proceeds.

But there are a host of entities, Your Honor, that are named on that additional insured page, at least with respect to the policy that my client is concerned with. And -- and that raises the issue of how is the debtor going to feasibly fund a plan of reorganization based on insurance proceeds, and I think that's the concept when other parties apparently have claims towards that -- towards the proceeds of that policy or at least are named additional insureds, including perhaps Mr. Sugrue's claim and certainly my claim and those that are named.

So that takes us -- even if we deal with the ownership issue of the business, it's a fundamental threshold issue as to how the debtor could possibly use funds that other parties have an interest in.

THE COURT: All right. That's -- that's a very simple answer.

1 MR. PREITE: Okay.

THE COURT: It depends on how much and who has an interest in the -- a direct interest in the insurance and how much comes back to the debtor. I assume all the policies say that the insurance -- the insureds are as their interests may appear. There is several hundred years of law on the question of what that means. And I think one of the debtor's goals is to avoid litigation on that subject, hopefully, because there's enough for everyone except, perhaps, for Mr. Sugrue's client who is coming forward with a \$32 million claim.

But I don't think your client has a \$32 million claim, does it?

MR. PREITE: No, Your Honor. It's under half a million. I think --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. PREITE: -- it's \$300,000.

THE COURT: So let's -- let's be optimistic. I haven't forgotten that that is a critical issue. We don't have either of the mortgagees here today. They were here last time. They're very interested in the proceeds.

And one of the reasons why I have delayed going forward with the debtor's proposed plan and disclosure statement, which has been on file, is that it doesn't and can't at this point really discuss with any certainty how

the insurance proceeds are going to be distributed because they haven't been received. We don't know how much they are. The 2 million doesn't even cover the two mortgagees on the real estate. Again, I'm not saying that they have a prior claim, but that all remains to be seen.

I have motions to convert outstanding. I have not acted on them because it appears that all of the principal creditors in the case are satisfied that those parties who are administering the estate are doing it fairly and with a reasonable and appropriate purposes. There are also some alleged concessions on the part of the landlord that are meaningful.

so -- and, of course, a conversion would be expensive. If anyone feels that things are not going forward appropriately, I have their -- I have their motions and they can certainly be heard. But we're proceeding on that basis and we certainly haven't forgotten that how to allocate the insurance proceeds is perhaps the key issue, but maybe it won't be an issue if there's enough to satisfy everyone.

MR. PREITE: Very well, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else today?

MR. SHAFFERMAN: Nothing else.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SHAFFERMAN: Thank you.

Page 41 1 THE COURT: So you will, then, let me know by the 2 end of the day whether there is any objection to the order on file with regard to paying over insurance proceeds into 3 4 the court. 5 MR. SHAFFERMAN: Right. And we will also add that 6 additional language that Mr. Preite suggested avoiding the 7 -- or having this order supersede the prior order which 8 directed the proceeds go into my firm's escrow. 9 THE COURT: All right. 10 MR. SHAFFERMAN: We'll modify that and circulate 11 it. 12 THE COURT: Very good. 13 MR. SHAFFERMAN: Thank you, Judge. 14 MR. SUGRUE: Thank you, Your Honor. 15 (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 11:51 16 a.m.) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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Page 43 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Sherri L. Breach, CERT\*D-397, certified that the 4 foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the 5 proceedings. 6 7 8 SHERRI L. BREACH 9 AAERT Certified Electronic Reporter & Transcriber 10 CERT\*D -397 11 12 13 Veritext 14 200 Old Country Road 15 Suite 580 16 Mineola, NY 11501 17 18 Date: January 14, 2013 19 20 21 22 23 24 25